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The advent of new broadcasting technologies has eliminated spectrum scarcity as a 
constraint on broadcasting, and with it one of the justifications for broadcast 
licensing. Have nations moved away from licensing as a form of regulation of their 
broadcasting sectors? And concomitantly, is there less opportunity to use licensing as 
a means of promoting the public interest in broadcasting? The authors address these 
questions through a comparative study of licensing requirements for terrestrial 
broadcasting and other forms of television and radio distribution in 18 Western 
nations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The digitization of broadcasting in Western countries is far advanced. The majority of member 
states of the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), as well as 
Australia and New Zealand, have already switched off analog television and completed the transition 
to digital television; in Canada and the United States analog television transmitters have been shut 
down in most markets. In contrast to television, analog terrestrial radio (AM and FM) still plays a 
central role. While the switchover is not imminent, the coverage of digital radio continues to extend 
and several countries are already starting to plan for the post-analog era. 
Digitization has far-reaching implications for broadcasting regulation. With spectrum scarcity no 
longer presenting a major problem, traditional market-entry regulation by way of licensing of private 
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broadcasting is called into question, and it becomes more challenging to commit private 
broadcasters to public interest goals in exchange for a license. Consequently, the digital switchover 
shakes broadcasting regulation to its very foundations. 
However, few studies deal with the licensing of private broadcasting. Existing research mostly 
focuses on the situation in particular countries;1 or, if comparative, was conducted long before the 
digital switchover came within reach. 2  Up-to-date large-scale comparative research focusing on 
current licensing regimes is missing so far. 
In this article we ask the question of whether licensing of private broadcasting is still used to shape 
the media system in the digital era or whether licensing is just an irrelevant blast from the past. In 
order to deal with this question, the article examines the licensing of private broadcasting in 18 
Western European and Anglo-Saxon media systems. More specifically, the comparison considers 
who is responsible for authorizing private broadcasting, whether a license is required or a 
notification is sufficient, how the process of awarding licenses is designed, which decision criteria are 
applied in case their is competition for a license, and how compliance with license conditions is 
evaluated. 
Results indicate that most countries, regardless of digitization, still heavily rely on licensing regimes 
in order to shape their media systems and to promote the public interest. With a few exceptions, not 
only analog terrestrial radio stations but also digital terrestrial television (e.g. DVB-T and ATCS) and 
radio stations (e.g. DAB-T and HD Radio) still require a license. Provisions for other means of 
distribution are less rigid: in half of the analyzed media systems, notifying the regulator is sufficient 
when operating a cable or satellite channel. 
In the next section, this article offers an overview of the role of licensing in broadcasting regulation 
and of existing research in order to develop a framework for comparison. After discussing the 
methods employed in this study, the results of the comparison will be presented. The final section 
discusses the results. 
 
THE LICENSING OF PRIVATE BROADCASTERS 
Scarcity of Frequencies and Promotion of the Public Interest 
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Whereas a regulated commercial system was in place in North America since the early days of 
broadcasting,3 public service broadcasting had a monopoly in most other Western countries up until 
the 1980s. When private radio and television were allowed due to the liberalization of broadcasting 
markets, 4  governments decided – as in many other industries 5  – to regulate market entry by 
introducing a licensing system.6  
Traditionally, regulation of market entry was justified with the technical necessity of allocating scarce 
terrestrial frequencies and avoiding interference between channels both domestically and 
internationally. Consequently, frequencies are understood as public goods and they lay in the hands 
of national governments.7 Aside from these technical considerations, licensing has always been used 
to promote the public interest by committing private broadcasters to societal objectives.8 McQuail 
emphasizes that not only public service media but also commercial media should contribute to the 
public interest.9 Yet the use of the term is often vague and “the public interest standard has often 
served primarily as a rhetorical tool, used on behalf of justifying particular policy actions.”10 In a very 
general sense, “public interest” refers to “the complex of supposed informational, cultural and social 
benefits to the wider society which go beyond the immediate, particular and individual interests of 
those who communicate in public communication.”11 Buckley et al. thus argue that licenses should 
be awarded by way of a “beauty contest” as auctions are “unlikely to produce a range and diversity 
of services that meet the needs of all sections in society.”12 They specifically mention requirements 
that promote diversity of content and maintain quality, like obligations to carry news and current 
affairs, educational or cultural programming, or locally-produced shows.13 Another way to promote 
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the public interest through licensing is the prevention of ownership concentration, by limiting the 
number of licenses one person or organization is allowed to hold.14   
With the introduction of new distribution channels like cable networks and satellites,15 the problem 
of scarcity of frequencies lost much of its urgency. While technological development does not 
determine whether regulation in the public interest suddenly becomes unnecessary, together with 
political and economic changes the new means of distribution had far-reaching implications for 
broadcasting regulation. In Europe, satellite technology allowed private commercial stations to 
circumvent domestic regulation by “operating from the most favorable regulatory base.”16 Coupled 
with changing political ideologies as well as a demand for regulatory change by media corporations 
and the advertising industry, this led to what Dyson and Humphreys called a “competitive 
deregulation.”17 
More recently, digitization increased the capacity of distribution channels even more, leading to a 
multiplication of radio and television stations.18 With the increasing market penetration of digital 
stations, the analog switch-off became viable. Today, the majority of European and Anglo-Saxon 
countries have switched off analog television and completed the transition to digital television. 
Whereas analog terrestrial radio (in most countries AM and FM) still plays a central role, the 
coverage of digital radio (DAB and DAB+) continues to expand, and several countries are already 
starting to plan for the post-analog era. As with the introduction of cable and satellite broadcasting 
30 years ago, digitization and convergence are used as arguments by governments to retreat from 
regulation “where it interferes with market development.” 19  Taylor for instance shows that for 
Canada, due to the transition to digital television, traditional regulatory principles promoting the 
public interest were abandoned.20 
In sum, this short overview of broadcasting regulation emphasizes that policymakers see 
technological developments as an opportunity and prioritize industrial policy at the expense of the 
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traditional goals of media policy.21 Hence, scholars argue that we are witnessing a paradigm shift in 
media policy from social and political goals to economic goals.22   
Yet despite these massive changes of the media landscape and calls for deregulation, terrestrial 
broadcasting still plays an important role even in today’s multi-channel environment. Certainly, 
terrestrial radio and television stations are usually retransmitted via cable and satellite and, at least 
with respect to television, a majority of households in many countries does not actually receive these 
stations over the air. Still these licensees benefit from terrestrial distribution. Moreover, a 
considerable percentage of households continues to rely on terrestrial television distribution (e.g. 
14.7 % in the US and 42.1 % in the UK).23 In radio, terrestrial distribution still dominates. Thus, it 
seems worthwhile to look into whether licensing of private broadcasting is still used to shape the 
media system in the digital era and how market entry of terrestrial and non-terrestrial broadcasting is 
regulated today. 
Literature Review 
While other fields of broadcasting regulation – especially public service broadcasting – receive much 
scholarly attention, this is not the case with respect to licensing of private broadcasters. The few 
studies on this topic are either limited in scope by focusing on a few empirical cases or, if 
comparative in nature, largely outdated. 
Concerning studies focused on single countries, Aslama, Hellman, and Sauri analyzed how 
intensified competition and regulatory decisions after the liberalization of the Finnish broadcasting 
market in 1993 affected the diversity of programming. They argue that licensing is the strongest 
instrument to regulate the industry’s structure and should be used to stimulate “moderate 
competition.”24 Enli and Sundet discuss the renewal of two commercial Norwegian radio stations’ 
licenses. While their main focus lies on the (discursive) battle between incumbents, the authors also 
offer detailed information about the licensing process. 25  In their working paper on German 
broadcasting regulation, Schulz et al. shortly describe market entry regulation of private broadcasting 
and the authorities involved.26 Focusing on the United States, Alexander and Brown analyze how the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) promotes goals like competition, diversity, or localism 
by licensing and other regulatory measures.27 Taking a critical perspective, Streeter discusses the 
historical development of the FCC’s licensing regime and the property status of licenses. He 
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emphasizes that licensing created a corporate-centered commercial broadcasting landscape whereas 
possible alternatives like amateur radio operators or non-profit broadcasters were “brushed aside or 
marginalized.”28 In his monograph on broadcasting policy in Canada, Armstrong also addresses 
questions of licensing when describing the characteristics and current reforms of the Canadian 
broadcasting system.29 
Most comparative studies dealing with private broadcasting focus on the liberalization of 
broadcasting or on private broadcasting regulation in general, but do not discuss licensing in detail.30 
A notable exception is Robillard’s monograph on regulatory bodies in 35 European countries.31 
Robillard sees the granting of licenses as “the main function of regulatory bodies”32 and he provides 
an overview of regulatory authorities and their powers to intervene in case of infringement. While 
also addressing other regulatory issues, Barendt,33 and Lange and Woldt,34 offer comparisons of 
licensing processes in several Western countries. The latter conclude that programs transmitted via 
cable or satellite are subjected to fewer requirements than terrestrial broadcasting. The most rigorous 
comparative analysis and therefore the most suitable base for further research was conducted by 
Hoffmann-Riem, who investigated the licensing process in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. He finds that program licenses in all six countries are 
granted by regulatory agencies, while frequencies are sometimes also awarded by governments. In 
case of competition for licenses, countries normally conduct a “beauty contest” to find the most 
suitable applicant. Aside from obligations, licenses are sometimes linked to privileges like subsidies 
or must-carry-obligations in cable networks. The countries use different sanctioning mechanisms in 
case of a breach of license conditions, but only some have implemented a systematic evaluation 
process.35  
Licensing in the Digital Era 
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Despite advances in the digitization of broadcasting distribution, the question of whether licensing 
of private broadcasting is still used to shape the media system in the digital era has not been dealt 
with so far. While radio spectrum allocation will remain a task of government, it can be expected 
that digitization is used as an argument by policymakers and industry representatives to move away 
from sector-specific broadcasting regulation to general economic regulation.36 As discussed above, in 
light of technological developments, policymakers often prioritize industrial policy at the expense of 
traditional goals of media policy. For non-terrestrial stations that are free of any technological 
justification for regulation, consumer choice and information abundance are powerful narratives that 
help in portraying market entry regulation in the public interest as obsolete. Hence, licensing regimes 
could be replaced by a notification system that only requires radio and television stations to notify 
the regulator of their operation. Such “light-touch” regulation would make committing private 
broadcasters to public interest goals much more challenging. Furthermore, regulatory attention 
could move from single stations to owners of infrastructure (e.g. cable companies or multiplex 
operators)37 as well as to new technological bottlenecks.38 It thus seems reasonable to expect that the 
traditional licensing of private broadcasting is called into question and that Western countries have 
already started to replace licensing regimes with notification systems, or that they generally abstain 
from regulation. 
Proposition 1: Due to digitization and related changes in the broadcasting market, the 
traditional licensing of radio and television stations is gradually replaced by light-touch 
regulation. 
Aside from this general tendency to reform the licensing of private broadcasting, we expect 
differences between countries in relation to their licensing systems. In general, it is possible to 
distinguish two different regulatory approaches to media diversity – a competition or market 
approach with a strong preference for economic regulation to correct market failures, and an 
interventionist or public regulation approach that emphasizes socio-political goals. 39  Previous 
research suggests that liberal media systems rely on a market approach, whereas particularly small 
democratic-corporatist media systems opt for a more interventionist approach.40 Accordingly, it can 
be expected that in small democratic-corporatist media systems licenses are awarded based on a 
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beauty contest, that compliance with license conditions is regularly evaluated and that licensees are 
guaranteed distribution of their stations. In contrast, in liberal media systems regulators tend to sell 
licenses to the highest bidder and to leave it up to stations to reach agreements with distributors 
themselves. 
Proposition 2: While small democratic-corporatist media systems tend to an interventionist 
approach to licensing, liberal media systems rely on a market approach. 
 
METHODS 
In this study, the licensing of private media in 18 Western European and Anglo-Saxon media 
systems was compared (see Table 1 below). Such so-called simple comparisons aim at systematic 
analyses of similarities and differences and thus allow for developing classifications and typologies.41 
The selection of cases was, on the one hand, informed by Hallin & Mancini’s typology of media 
systems comparing liberal, democratic-corporatist, and polarized-pluralist countries.42 On the other 
hand, the sample includes both big and small media systems, some of the latter also featuring a so-
called next-door giant neighbor.43 Accordingly, the comparison should allow us to find out whether 
characteristics of the media system and related features of media policy have any influence on the 
licensing of private broadcasting. 
 
Table 1: The media systems analyzed in this study. 
AU: Australia DK: Denmark NL: Netherlands 
AT: Austria DE: Germany NO: Norway 
BE/VG: Belgium/Flemish Community FI: Finland NZ: New Zealand 
BE/CF: Belgium/French Community FR: France SE: Sweden 
CA: Canada IE: Ireland UK: United Kingdom 
CH: Switzerland IT: Italy US: United States 
 
The comparison was based on a qualitative analysis of documents. 44  For this purpose, various 
documents that refer to licensing of private broadcasters were collected and analyzed. In a first step 
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all relevant documents, including legal documents (e.g. acts, decrees, and agreements between 
governments and private broadcasters) as well as explanatory notes that accompany them, policy 
documents, and secondary literature that focuses on the current situation or reform proposals under 
discussion, were collected and critically assessed.45 Subsequently, the documents were analyzed using 
a method of deductive content categorization.46   
The category system for analyzing the licensing of private broadcasting is loosely based on the work 
of Hoffmann-Riem47 and consists of three main parts (see Table 2 below). First, the general licensing 
regime is investigated. This includes requirements to obtain a license or to notify the regulator of a 
station’s operation as well as the potential necessity to get frequencies allocated in a separate 
procedure. Second, the licensing process and conditions are inspected. This includes the authority in 
charge of awarding the license, the requirements for applications, the phases of the process, the 
selection principles employed, the privileges and obligations attached to licenses, and the term and 
renewal procedure. Third, the analysis focuses on sanctions in case of breaches of license conditions 
and potential evaluation processes. 
Table 2: Categories used for document analysis. 
Licensing Regime 
Licensing and Notification Requirement  
Approval of Frequencies 
Licensing Process and License Conditions 
Responsibility 
Requirements for Application 
Phases of Licensing Process 
Selection principle 
Privileges of Licensees 
Obligations of Licensees 
Term & Renewal 
Supervision & Evaluation 
Sanctions for Breaches of License Conditions 
Evaluation Mechanisms 
 
RESULTS 
In this section, the results of the comparative analysis are presented. Corresponding to the categories 
developed for empirical analysis, we will first give an overview of licensing regimes before dealing 
with the process of licensing and license conditions as well as with supervision and evaluation.  
Licensing Regime 
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Licensing and Notification Requirements: As in the analog past, in the majority of the analyzed 
countries private television stations need a license for digital terrestrial broadcasting. Only a few 
countries – namely Denmark, Switzerland, and the French and Flemish Communities of Belgium48  
– have replaced the traditional licensing regime with a notification system. Accordingly, television 
stations distributed digitally only need to notify the regulatory agency of their operation (see Table 3 
below). 
Requirements are less rigid for non-terrestrial television stations. In the French and Flemish 
Communities of Belgium, and in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, a notification is sufficient 
for cable and satellite TV stations; whereas in Canada, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom a license is still needed. In Austria, a license is needed for satellite channels, but for 
cable channels a notification is sufficient. Only in New Zealand and the United States are neither a 
license nor a notification required.49   
 
 
Table 3: Licensing vs. Notification Requirements for TV Stations. 
 Licensing Requirement Notification 
Requirement 
No Obligation 
Digital Terrestrial 
Commercial Channels 
AT, AU, CA, DE, FI, FR, 
IE, IT, NL, NO, NZ, SE, 
UK, US 
BE/VG, BE/CF, CH, DK  
Digital Terrestrial Non-
Commercial Channels 
AT, AU, BE/VG (regional 
stations), BE/CF (regional 
stations) CA, DE, DK, FI, 
FR, IE, IT, NL, NO, NZ, 
SE, UK, US 
CH  
Other Forms of 
Distribution  
AT (satellite), AU, CA, 
DE, FR, IE, IT, NL, UK 
AT (cable), BE/VG, 
BE/CF, CH, DK, FI, FR 
(small stations), IT 
(internet), NO, SE 
AU (narrowcasting), NZ, 
US 
 
In contrast to television, the digital switchover has not yet taken place for terrestrial radio. 
Accordingly, analog radio stations are still in operation. While analog-terrestrial radio stations are 
subjected to licensing in all the analyzed countries, a license is usually also required for digital-
terrestrial radio stations (mostly DAB-T). Only in Switzerland and in the French and Flemish 
                                                          
48 Switzerland is a special case. While private broadcasters only need to notify the regulator about their operation, 
licenses are still widely used because radio and TV stations benefit from certain privileges (must-carry requirements and 
subsidies) in exchange for a program remit. 
49 Some media systems – i.e. Australia, France, and Italy – abstain from regulating market entry of certain TV stations 
(e.g. small stations or Internet TV). 
 
 
Communities of Belgium do DAB-T stations not required the have a license, but they are subjected 
to a notification requirement50 (see Table 4 below). 
As with television, regulation of market-entry is less strict for non-terrestrial broadcasting. In half of 
the analyzed media systems, a notification system was implemented for non-terrestrial radio stations. 
In Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the French and Flemish Communities of Belgium, 
notifying the regulator is sufficient for cable and satellite radio stations. In contrast, in Canada, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom a license is also required for cable and satellite 
radio stations. In Austria, a license is needed for satellite radio stations whereas a notification is 
sufficient for cable radio stations. Like in the TV sector, only New Zealand and the United States do 
without licensing or notification requirements for non-terrestrial radio stations.51 
 
Table 4: Licensing vs. Notification Requirements for Radio Stations. 
 Licensing Requirement Notification 
Requirement 
No Obligation 
Analog Terrestrial 
Stations 
all   
Digital Terrestrial 
Stations 
AT, AU, CA, DE, DK, FI, 
FR, IE, IT, NL, NO, NZ, 
SE, UK, US 
BE/CF, BE/VG, CH  
Other Forms of 
Distribution 
AT (satellite), AU, CA, 
DE, FR, IE, IT, NL, UK 
AT (cable), BE/CF, 
BE/VG, CH, DE 
(internet), DK, FI, FR 
(small stations), NO, SE 
AU (pay-radio, 
narrowcasting), DK 
(internet), NZ, US 
 
Approval of Programs or Frequencies: In the majority of the analyzed countries, a license for 
terrestrial broadcasting is automatically linked to the right to distribute the program on an analog 
frequency or in a digital multiplex. However, in some countries, such so-called program licenses 
offer no guarantee for terrestrial distribution (see Table 5 below). Consequently, either an additional 
distribution license or a contract with a multiplex operator is needed. 
For analog-terrestrial radio stations an additional distribution license is required in Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the French and Flemish 
Communities of Belgium. Keeping program licenses and the right for terrestrial distribution apart is 
also relevant in digital broadcasting. In a number of media systems a distribution license is required 
for digital terrestrial distribution, namely in Canada, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and the French Community of Belgium. The licensing process varies considerably between media 
systems and is sometimes even more demanding than the process of getting a program license (see 
the Licensing Process and License Conditions sub-section below). In contrast, radio and television stations 
                                                          
50 Norway still has a formal licensing requirement in place for DAB-T. In practice, however, it equals a notification 
system. 
51 Australia, France, and Germany have less rigid requirements in place for small stations or Internet radio stations. 
 
 
holding a program license in Austria, Denmark, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the 
Flemish Community of Belgium have to negotiate the terms of digital terrestrial distribution 
individually with multiplex operators on the free market. However, in some countries (e.g. Austria 
and Norway) multiplex operators have to carry certain stations. 
 
Table 5: Countries that do not guarantee terrestrial distribution. 
Additional License for Terrestrial Distribution Negotiation with Multiplex 
Operator Analog-Terrestrial Radio Stations All Terrestrial Stations 
BE/VG, DK, NO BE/CF, CA, DE, FI, NL, SE BE/VG, DK, NO 
 
Licensing Process and Licensing Conditions 
Responsibility: Both government ministries and regulatory agencies are involved in the licensing of 
private broadcasters and the allocation of terrestrial frequencies (see Table 6 below). In two-thirds of 
the analyzed media systems, the regulatory agency for broadcasting is responsible for awarding 
licenses to radio and TV stations. However, in one third of the analyzed systems, government 
retains the right to license broadcasters. Partly, we find divided responsibilities for different kinds of 
broadcasters: 
 In the French Community of Belgium, government is only responsible for the licensing of 
regional television stations, whereas other licenses (non-regional digital terrestrial 
broadcasting and as analog radio) are awarded by the regulatory agency. 
 In Italy, government awards licenses for terrestrial and cable broadcasting, whereas the 
regulatory agency grants licenses for satellite channels. 
 In Norway, government is responsible for licensing national channels, and the regulatory 
agency is responsible for the licensing of regional channels. 
Distribution licenses for terrestrial distribution are in most cases awarded by the regulatory agency 
for either broadcasting or telecommunications. 
 
Table 6: Responsibility for awarding licenses and frequencies. 
 Government Regulatory Agency 
Program License  BE/CF (regional TV), BE/VG, 
CH, FI, IT (terrestrial & cable), 
NZ, NO (national) 
AT, AU, BE/CF (analog terrestrial 
radio), DVB-T), CA, DE, DK, FR, 
IE, IT (satellite), NL, NO (regional), 
SE, UK, US 
Distribution License CA, DK, NL BE/CF, BE/VG, DE, FI, NO, SE 
 
 
 
Requirements for Application: Applicants for licenses usually have to fulfill certain requirements. 
First, they often have to prove their financial and/or technical ability to operate a radio or TV 
station. In Austria, Norway, and the United Kingdom, applicants have to show a contract with a 
multiplex operator assuring terrestrial distribution. Second, applicants in most media systems have to 
be independent from political organizations. Third, the number of licenses that can be awarded to 
an applicant or the maximum audience market share that a single company is allowed to gain are 
often limited in order to prevent ownership concentration. Austria, Australia, Belgium, France, 
Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States have implemented such barriers. 
Phases of the Licensing Process: Generally, applicants have to submit a written application 
containing information about ownership and the planned program as well as proving compliance 
with the above-mentioned requirements. However, there are differences as to when applications can 
be submitted. While licenses for terrestrial broadcasting are mostly announced by a call for tender, 
applications for the licensing of non-terrestrial stations can usually be submitted at any time (see 
Table 7 below). Only in Canada, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands can applications for all types 
of licenses be submitted continuously. 
The responsible bodies proceed with a simple check of legal requirements before awarding licenses 
– at least when there is no competition for a certain license. In several countries – namely Canada, 
France, Switzerland, and the United States – authorities can organize a hearing or conduct a 
consultation to assess applications. In Austria, ministries of the Länder can state their opinion if 
radio stations in their area apply for licenses. 
The two different proceedings are also found in the approval of terrestrial frequencies. In general, 
stations can apply for a distribution license as soon as they are granted a program license. However, 
in Germany and the French Community of Belgium, frequencies are announced by a separate call 
for tender. 
 
Table 7: Tendering of licenses and frequencies. 
 Call for Tender Continuous Application 
Program Licenses  AT (AR), AU (terrestrial), 
BE/CF (AR), BE/VG (AR), 
CH, DK, FI, FR (terrestrial), IE 
(AR), NO (AR), SE (terrestrial 
radio), UK (AR, local DVB-T), 
NZ, US 
AT (digital terrestrial & satellite), 
AU (cable, satellite & internet), CA, 
DE, FR (non-terrestrial), IE (cable 
& satellite), IT, NL, NO (digital 
terrestrial), SE (DVB-T), UK (digital 
terrestrial, cable & satellite) 
Distribution License BE/CF, DE FI, NL, BE/VG; CA, DK, NO, SE 
 Note: AR = analog-terrestrial radio. 
 
Selection Principle: As just mentioned, licenses are usually granted when all the predefined legal 
requirements are met. However, in case of competition for licenses (and frequencies), the 
 
 
responsible agency or ministry has to select between applicants. Two different systems of selection 
can be distinguished: auctions and beauty contests (see Table 8 below). In the majority of analyzed 
media systems, licenses are awarded using a so-called beauty contest that evaluates applications in 
light of their fulfilment of license conditions. Often-used criteria include the plurality of programs 
and providers, program concepts, the willingness to produce programs locally, solid funding, or the 
experience of the applicant. In some countries auctions are held to sell licenses to the highest bidder. 
While in Denmark and Sweden auctions are used for analog-terrestrial radio licenses, in Australia, 
New Zealand, and the United States licenses for commercial stations are sold to the highest bidder. 
 
Table 8: Selection Principle in Case of Competition. 
 Auction Beauty Contest 
Program Licenses  AU (commercial free-to-air), 
DK (AR), NZ (commercial 
free-to-air), SE (AR), 
US (commercial) 
AT (AR), AU (non-commercial), 
BE/CF, BE/VG, CA, CH, DK 
(digital terrestrial), FI, FR, IE (AR), 
NO (AR), NZ, (non-commercial), 
SE (digital terrestrial), UK, (AR, 
local DVB-T), US (non-commercial) 
Distribution License NL BE/CF, NL, DE, FI 
 Note: AR = analog-terrestrial radio. 
 
Privileges for Licensees: Licenses are often linked to privileges (see Table 9 below). The most 
common privilege is a must-carry obligation for cable distribution. While in Switzerland and the 
United States all licensed stations have to be distributed via cable, in other countries must-carry rules 
are only coupled to certain stations (e.g. local stations or non-commercial stations). 
 
Table 9: Privileges linked to licenses. 
Must-Carry for 
Cable Distribution 
All channels CH, US 
Specific channels AT, BE/CF, BE/VG, CA, DE, FI, IE, SE 
Subsidies BE/VG, BE/CF, CA, CH, DK 
 
A less-common privilege is the subsidization of licensed broadcasters. Stations can either apply for 
subsidies, or they receive a slice of the license fee for public service broadcasters: 
 In Canada, campus or community radio stations may receive support by the Community 
Radio Fund of Canada; until recently local television states in rural areas could benefit from 
the Local Programming Improvement Fund.52   
                                                          
52 After a public hearing, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission decided to phase out this 
fund on September 1, 2014. The fund, which was created in 2008 in order to support broadcasters in a difficult financial 
 
 
 In the French and Flemish communities of Belgium, regional TV stations can receive 
production aid.  
 Non-commercial terrestrial broadcasters in Denmark can apply for subsidies (TV) or receive 
a slice of license fee revenues (radio).  
 In Switzerland, radio and TV licenses for local broadcasters are coupled to a share of license 
fee revenues. 
Obligations of Licensees: In many countries licenses come not only with privileges but also with 
obligations. These can concern either the organization of the licensed broadcasters or the program 
content: 
 On the organizational level stations can be committed to adopt an editorial charter (Austria, 
Switzerland, and the French and Flemish Communities of Belgium) or to become a member 
of the press council (French Community of Belgium). Furthermore, requirements for the 
composition of the board of directors may exist (e.g. for regional TV stations in the French 
and Flemish Communities of Belgium).  
 On the content level, radio and TV stations can be obliged to transmit a program for a 
minimum number of hours per day (e.g. in Austria, Finland, France, New Zealand, and 
Norway); to broadcast local content about the license area and/or to produced their content 
locally (e.g. in Australia, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the Flemish Community of Belgium). Non-commercial stations are often 
forbidden to air advertising (e.g. in Denmark, Switzerland, United Kingdom). 
Term and Renewal of Licenses: In most cases licenses are valid for five to twelve years (see Table 
9 below). While in most countries the same duration applies to all types of licenses, in other 
countries the term for which a license is awarded varies. 
 
Table 9: Term of license. 
5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years 9 years 10 years 12 years No term or 
variable 
term 
AU, DK, 
FR (AR), 
NL 
IT (AR, 
DVB-S),  
NO (AR) SE (DAB-
T, AR), US 
BE/CF, 
BE/VG 
AT, CH, FI, 
FR, NZ 
(AR) 
IT (DVB-T, 
DAB-T), 
UK (cable 
and satellite 
radio, local 
DVB-T) 
CA, IE, 
NZ, UK 
Note: AR = analog-terrestrial radio. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
period, is argued to have fulfilled its purpose. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 
“Discontinuing the Local Program Improvement Fund (LPIF),” press release, Mar. 21, 2014, accessed Oct. 4, 2014, 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/info_sht/tv13.htm. 
 
 
 
Half of the analyzed media systems (Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Flemish Community of Belgium) have 
implemented a simplified procedure for the renewal of licenses. In Ireland for instance, such a 
simplified procedure is conducted if the incumbent is the only applicant for the license in question. 
In France, licenses can be renewed up to two times without announcement if the incumbent has not 
violated the license conditions and is able to reach an agreement with the regulatory agency. 
Supervision and Evaluation 
Sanctions for Breaches of License Conditions: A variety of sanctions exist in case of non-
compliance with license conditions. The most common sanctions are fines and the revocation of the 
license (see Table 10 below). Most regulators also make use of official letters to stations that are in 
breach of conditions and have the option to order temporary suspension of operation. In some 
media systems, radio and TV stations are obligated to air a reprimand in their own programming or 
to pay for the publication of a reprimand in the local newspaper.  
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Sanctions in case of infringements. 
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AT X X X     X 
AU X X    X  X 
BE/CF X X X X X X  X 
BE/VG X X X X  X  X 
CA  X    X  X 
CH X X    X  X 
DE X X   X   X 
DK  X    X  X 
FI  X      X 
FR X X X  X X  X 
IE  X    X  X 
 
 
IT  X    X  X 
NL  X      X 
NO X X    X  X 
NZ X X      X 
SE  X      X 
UK  X X   X X X 
US X x      X 
 
Evaluation Mechanisms: Compliance with license conditions is evaluated only partly: 
 In some media systems, licensed broadcasters have to report on the fulfillment of their 
program remit. This is the case in the French Community of Belgium (for analog terrestrial 
radio and TV stations), New Zealand (for non-commercial channels and local terrestrial 
radio), Norway (local analog-terrestrial radio), and the United Kingdom (for all licensed 
stations).  
 In Switzerland, licensed local broadcasters must not only commission regular evaluations of 
their organization (the results of which are then discussed with the regulator) but their 
programs are also analyzed by communication scholars on behalf of the regulator. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this article we set out to examine the licensing of private broadcasting in 18 Western European 
and Anglo-Saxon media systems. Due to digitization and related market developments that have 
brought about a myriad of radio and television stations available to viewers and listeners, 
policymakers are increasingly forced to scrutinize the meaningfulness of traditional market entry 
regulation for private broadcasting. Yet up-to-date comparative research that analyzes the 
repercussions of digitization for the licensing of broadcasting is missing. Given that licenses are an 
important instrument for committing broadcasters to public interest objectives, we ask the question 
of whether licensing of private broadcasting is still used to shape the media system in the digital era 
or whether licensing is just an irrelevant blast from the past. 
Given the increasing reach of digital terrestrial broadcasting, we first proposed that traditional 
licensing regimes are replaced by light-touch regulation like a requirement for notification. However, 
the results indicate that despite digitization, most countries still heavily rely on licensing regimes in 
order to shape their media systems. With a few exceptions, not only analog-terrestrial radio stations 
but also digital-terrestrial TV and radio stations require licenses. Such licenses are still used to shape 
the media system in the public interest. This is done for instance through application requirements 
(independence from political organizations, limitations on the number of licenses to be held by a 
single owner), the formulation of license conditions (e.g. production and transmission of local 
 
 
content), as well as elaborate beauty contests for awarding licenses to the applicant that best meets 
these conditions.  
Provisions for non-terrestrial broadcasting (e.g. satellite and cable channels) are less rigid. In half of 
the analyzed media systems it is sufficient for radio and TV stations to notify the regulator about 
their operation. And while half of the analyzed media systems still award licenses to such channels, 
in the absence of competition most bodies responsible for licensing leave it at a simple check of 
legal requirements before awarding licenses. Accordingly, Proposition 1 (see above) is only partly 
supported. Whereas regulators are indeed mostly relying on light-touch regulation with notification 
requirements or formal checks only for non-terrestrial broadcasting, terrestrial radio and TV stations 
are still required to have licenses in most cases and thus are subject to regulation in the public 
interest. 
Based on previous research into the relations between media systems and media regulation,53 we 
secondly proposed that small democratic-corporatist media systems are more prone to an 
interventionist approach to licensing whereas liberal media systems rely on a market approach. 
Results are, however, not as clear-cut. They still provide some support for Proposition 2 (see above). 
To begin with, auctions to sell licenses to the highest bidder are less common in small democratic-
corporatist media systems than in liberal media systems. Small democratic-corporatist media systems 
mostly rely on beauty contests to select which applicant should be awarded a license. Moreover, a 
simplified renewal for expiring licenses is found in all analyzed liberal media systems but only in a 
few of the democratic-corporatist countries.  
However, the results unexpectedly indicate that especially large media systems like Germany, France, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom still rely on licensing regimes for all forms of distribution. In 
contrast, the Belgian Communities, Denmark, and Switzerland make do with notification-only 
systems for digital-terrestrial radio and/or television stations as well as for non-terrestrial forms of 
distribution. Hence it becomes clear that licensing practices do not simply correspond to Hallin and 
Mancini’s three models of media systems. Scholars criticize that the attribution of countries to 
certain models is not always adequate, and they highlight the relative neglect of some system-
differentiating factors. For instance, the path-dependency of countries’ media systems and regulation 
is stressed from the perspective of historical institutionalism, pointing to a range of salient political, 
legal, and economic variables that ultimately also bear on market entry regulation in broadcasting.54   
Digitization and connected social and economic developments challenge the traditional regulation of 
broadcasting markets. Therefore, market entry regulation by way of licensing private broadcasting 
could be assumed to be a blast from the past. However, the results indicate that licensing is still used 
as an instrument to shape media systems in the public interest and to commit private broadcasters to 
                                                          
53 Hallin and Mancini; Puppis et al., (2009)  
54 Peter Humphreys, “A Political Scientist’s Contribution to the Comparative Study of Media Systems in Europe: A 
Response to Hallin and Mancini,” in Trends in Communication Policy Research: New Theories, Methods and Subjects, ed. Natascha 
Just and Manuel Puppis (Chicago: Intellect, 2012), 157-176; Jonathan Hardy, “Comparing Media Systems,” in The 
Handbook of Comparative Communication Research, ed. Frank Esser and Thomas Hanitzsch (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
185-206. 
 
 
societal objectives in most countries. Digitization alone does not determine a renunciation of 
traditional broadcasting regulation. Instead, the political will to reform seems to be equally 
important. Furthermore, the comparison of 18 Western media systems shows a wide variety of 
policy options for the design of licensing regimes and processes. Such knowledge is not only of 
scholarly interest but could also be useful for policymakers when scrutinizing the suitability of their 
current licensing regime. While technological developments are about to eliminate one of the 
traditional justifications for licensing, market entry regulation proves to remain a meaningful 
possibility for shaping the media system in the public interest – even in the digital era. 
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